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SISTEM PENGURUSAN KESELANAN TERAGIH UNTUK MENGURANGKAN 
IDS POSITIF-PALSU 
ABSTRAK 
Setiap sistem keselamatan mempunyai kemungkinan untuk gagal. Justeru, usaha yang lebih 
perlu diambil untuk melindungi sistem-sistem ini. Sistem Pengesanan Pencerobohan (IDSs) 
telah dicadangkan sebagai perlindungan tambahan bagi sistem-sistem keselamatan. IDS 
merupakan suatu sistem keselamatan digunakan untuk melindungi persekitaran komputer. Ia 
mencetuskan ribuan amaran sehari yang membolehkan juruanalisis keselamatan 
mengesahkan kerelevanan dan keterukan setiap amaran berdasarkan kepada kriteria 
pengagregatan dan korelasi.  Beberapa kaedah pengagregatan dan korelasi telah 
dicadangkan untuk mengumpul amaran tersebut. Tesis ini membentangkan satu Sistem 
Pengurusan Amaran IDS (IDSAMS) baru yang merupakan suatu sistem selari untuk 
mengurus amaran IDS, mengurangkan positif palsu melalui pengagregatan dan korelasi 
amaran IDS bagi memberi kefahaman sepenuhnya tentang serangan pada rangkaian di 
samping memudahkan kerja juruanalisis serta menjimatkan masa mereka.   
 
IDSAMS merupakan satu sistem kendiri yang berfungsi berdasarkan amaran nyata daripada 
data dalam atau luar talian menjadi Sistem Penyiasatan Forensik.  Sistem ini dibangunkan 
daripada gabungan algoritma pengagregatan dan korelasi. Setiap satu daripada dua algoritma 
tersebut telah dilaksanakan untuk membentuk satu sistem kendiri yang lengkap. Sistem 
pengagregatan bertujuan menyingkirkan lebihan daripada fail amaran dan mengurangkan 
positif palsu. Sementara sistem korelasi bertujuan untuk menyingkirkan positif palsu, 
mengurangkan jumlah amaran dan menyelesaikan perkaitan antara amaran. IDSAMS 
xvi 
 
bertujuan membantu juruanalisis memperoleh gambaran keseluruhan yang kukuh tentang 
aktiviti berkaitan keselamatan pada rangkaian.  
 
IDSAMS menggunakan algoritma korelasi yang dikenali sebagai Korelasi Kumpulan Selari 
(P-GCA) yang meningkatkan Algoritma Korelasi Kumpulan (GCA). GCA 
menghubungkaitkan keputusan pengagregatan tersaring untuk memberikan keputusan yang 
lebih baik dan tepat dalam masa yang singkat. GCA dibangunkan daripada algoritma 
pengagregatan yang dikenali sebagai Algoritma Pengagregatan Ambang Masa (TTA). 
Penggunaan keselarian dalam sistem pengagregatan dan korelasi mampu meningkatkan 
kelajuan bagi mendapatkan keputusan akhir daripada amaran yang terkorelasi.  
 
Keputusan menunjukkan bahawa IDSAMS menghubungkaitkan amaran IDS secara tepat 
berdasarkan permintaan pengguna dan nilai ambang.  Keputusan IDSMAS memberikan dua 
tahap yang berbeza: Tahap pertama adalah sistem pengagregatan untuk menyingkirkan 
amaran yang berlebihan.  Sistem pengagregatan mengurangkan jumlah amaran sebanyak 
41% jika pilihan adalah 8 sifat dan 50%  dengan 4 sifat pilihan. Keputusan ini dianggap 
sebagai tahap pertama untuk mengurangkan positif palsu daripada fail amaran heterogen 
IDS.  Tahap kedua adalah keputusan sistem korelasi dengan peningkatan 94 peratus 
daripada keputusan pengagregatan.  Oleh itu, sistem korelasi berfungsi ke atas keputusan 
pengagregatan (41 peratus dan 50 peratus) yang memberikan 6 peratus daripada fail amaran 
heterogen asal. Peningkatan keseluruhan adalah 97.84 peratus daripada amaran sebenar 
tanpa amaran positif palsu dan amaran berlebihan. Keputusan selari menunjukkan bahawa 
sistem pengagregatan dan korelasi dapat mengurangkan masa pemprosesan keseluruhan 
dengan kelajuan adalah dalam julat 1.406 sehingga 1.614 dengan teras dual dan 2.14 
sehingga 3.23 dengan teras kuad. 
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PARALLEL NETWORK MANAGEMENT SYSTEM TO REDUCE IDS FALSE 
POSITIVE 
ABSTRACT 
Every secure system has the possibility to fail. Therefore, extra effort should be taken to 
protect these systems. Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) had been proposed with the 
aim of providing extra protection to security systems. IDS is a powerful computer 
security system used to secure the computer environments. These systems trigger 
thousands of alerts per day, which prompt security analysts to verify each alert for 
relevance and severity based on an aggregation and correlation criterion. Several 
aggregation and correlation methods have been proposed to collect these alerts. This 
thesis presents a new IDS Alerts Management System (IDSAMS) which is a parallel 
system used to manage the IDS alerts, reduce the false positive by aggregating and 
correlating the IDS alerts to give full understanding of the network attacks as well as 
easing the process for the analysts and save their time. 
 
IDS Alerts management system is a standalone system which can work based on real 
alerts from an online data or offline data as full a Forensic Investigation System. This 
system was built by combining the aggregation algorithm and correlation algorithm. 
Each one of these two algorithms had been implemented to form a complete standalone 
system. The aggregation system aims to remove the redundancy from the alert’s file and 
reduce the false positive, while the correlation system aims to remove the false positive, 
reduce the alerts amount and resolve the relations between the alerts. IDSAMS aims to 
help the analyst to have a strong overview of security-related activities on the network. 
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IDSAMS employs a correlation algorithm called Parallel Group Correlation (P-GCA) 
which is an enhancement of our Group Correlation Algorithm (GCA). GCA correlates 
the filtered aggregation results to give better and accurate results in a short time. GCA 
was built over an aggregation algorithm called Time Threshold Aggregation algorithm 
(TTA). The use of parallel in the aggregation system and the correlation system is to 
enhance the speed up of getting the final results of correlated alerts. 
 
Results show that IDSAMS correlates IDS alerts accurately based on user demands and 
threshold value. The results of IDSMAS have two different stages: First stage is the 
aggregation system to remove the redundant alerts. The aggregation system reduced the 
amount of alerts by 41% if the choice is 8 features and 50% with 4 features choice. 
These results consider as the first step of reducing the false positive from IDS 
heterogeneous alerts file. The second stage is the correlation system results where the 
enhancement is 94% of the aggregation results. The correlation system works on the 
aggregation results (the 41% and the 50%) which give us 6% of original heterogeneous 
alerts’ file. The overall enhancement is 97.84% of real alerts without false positive and 
redundant alerts. The parallel results show that the overall processing time had been 
reduced by parallelizing the aggregation system and the correlation system, the speedup 
results was on the range of 1.406 to 1.614 over Dual cores and 2.41 to 3.23 over Quad 
cores. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the recent past, networks and their applications have become indispensable in the 
creation of any organization. Local area networks (LAN) have become more 
complicated in their infrastructure, since each organization network requires specific 
infrastructure, and thus numerous sub-networks to fulfill the needs of each department. 
On top of that, wireless networks can be added to these organizations to ease the 
connectivity process for the users through their personal laptops or smart phones. All of 
these create complex, highly dynamic networks. Above all, security in the Internet has 
become one of the urgent topics that should be addressed. Security has become a 
primary concern because of these complicated issues.  
 
1.1 Security Issues 
In the past, computers were not connected to each other owing to the absence of a 
network to connect them. Subsequently, the concept of network with the capacity to 
connect computers in the same companies, in the same building was established. 
Nowadays, approximately all computers are connected to the Internet. The main concern 
with this issue is the increased number of possible attackers that can harm any system. 
Moreover, an attacker can assail any computer either by connecting to the same local 
area network or from almost anywhere in the world. 
 
Storing important and sensitive data in computers has made the issue of security more 
important than ever. Previously, students’ or employees’ records were stored by filing 
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them as hardcopies in an archive. Keeping records safe used to be an easy process. 
Stealing or copying files requires a physical attack. At present, records are stored in 
computers, making them more vulnerable to spiteful attackers. Storing records in 
computers makes the attacking process easier. All that the attacker needs is a remote 
connection from an outside location, without necessarily entering the location of the 
stored records. Storing records and data on paper remains important, like in the case of 
banks, where the customer’s account transactions are recorded in receipts that serve as 
evidence of these transactions, if the system collapsed. This is important because 
financial issues are very sensitive.  
 
At present, there exists Internet banking systems, which do not provide the customer 
with an official receipt bearing an official stamp. Moreover, other companies, such as 
telecommunications firms, give discounts to customers who are amenable to non-paper-
based receipts when using either the e-payment or the normal payment method.  
Most businesses rely on computer systems to execute their data work. This reliance has 
become full dependence, such as in the case of Internet-based businesses, where a lack 
of connection or network failure will result in no business. Furthermore, an unplanned 
computer shut down may cause a leak in data.  
 
Some organizations rely on paper work to support their Internet-based systems. They 
calculate the price of a chosen item, print out the receipt, and send it by regular mail. 
 
The changes in the way that businesses deal with storing and retrieving data increase the 
number of potential attacks, and consequently, successful attacks become more serious. 
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Successful attacks also enable attackers to improve their techniques. At present however, 
it is rare to see a single successful attack on a single computer because it takes multiple 
attacks for one to be successful. Moreover, these attacks can be on one or more 
computers. 
  
These kinds of attacks have become a challenging issue, and it is hard to protect a 
network against them. Furthermore, it is not easy to know if the attackers used multiple 
attack techniques, especially if their attacks originate from outside the network. 
Computer security is an important topic. Securing and limiting access to private and 
sensitive data and ensuring the availability of critical security systems are important. 
Computer security should accomplish these goals. 
 
1.2 Security Techniques 
Security in computer systems can be achieved using three techniques: authentication, 
authorization, and accounting. These techniques are necessary to protect the computer 
network against brutal attacks (Etoh & Wiley, 2005; Niemi, 2002; Todoro, 2007). 
 
Authentication is the process of giving personal information to the computer system.  
The authentication process requires a saved user name and a password to match it. The 
assumption here is that only the owner of that personal information with its matching 
password will be able to log on to the system. This will enable the system to know the 
identity of the users who log on to it or to retrieve the information from the system 
memory if needed. 
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There are various ways to do the authentication process, either by using one process or 
by combining two or more processes. Examples of these processes are: typing in 
information that the user knows, such as the password; using a smart card or special 
device; and using a part of the user’s body like the eye, thumb, or voice. 
 
Authorization is the process of checking if the operation is being performed by the 
authorized logged on user. Each system grants privileges; if a user does not have the 
privilege to perform an operation, the access would be blocked. Authorization will rely 
on the authentication process in order to function. If authorization fails, a user who has 
the intention of gaining access to secured data can cheat the system. The authorization 
process is performed by the system before it gives file access permission to a user, and 
this process will be executed each time a user tries to access any protected resource 
when logged on, based on the user’s privileges. 
 
Accounting or auditing is the process of recording security data related to a user's 
activities. The data will be stored in a log file, which may contain the user ID, time of 
login, time of logout, the IP used for login, and any other information related to the user 
resource files he or she tried to access. The idea behind auditing is to keep a record of 
any type of authorized or unauthorized access to any resource. 
 
Another related topic is cryptography, which is not a security technique in itself. 
However, this is very important to be able to secure the sensitive traffic data and to 
prevent outsiders form hacking into the data. However, data encryption and decryption 
during sending and receiving sensitive data can be easily broken if there is any leak 
between the server and the login user computer (Stallings, 2011). 
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1.3 Security Techniques Failures 
When there is permeation of the security, all the sensitive data in the system will be at 
real risk. Permeation can be done if a fault exists in the security. Techniques such as 
Bypass security techniques, Spoof security techniques, and Guess security techniques 
can be implemented (Löf  et al., 2010).  
 
Bypass security technique is designed to enable the attacker to access the protected data 
without interrupting the system and allows the attacker to listen to the buffer overflow. 
As the user enters his personal data such as the password in a specific part of a memory, 
the attacker will implement his or her code in such way that he or she is enabled to recall 
the address of that function which is responsible for writing on a specific part of 
memory. Consequently, the attacker will be able to run any code that he or she demands. 
Thus, any authorization or access controls can be bypassed easily (Thompson, 2003). 
 
Spoof security technique is designed to facilitate changing the authenticated identity of 
the attacker. For example, when the technique is successful in attacking the 
authentication based on IP, it becomes easy for the attacker to spoof the IP and use it to 
change his identity. 
 
Guess security techniques is based on guessing. Thus, if the password is guessable, the 
attacker can run a dictionary attack and login as a system member-user. Other 
techniques are user-dependent. When editing the features of a system configuration, 
unwanted programs can be installed. In other instances, the end user will be tricked into 
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revealing information. This technique is called social engineering attack. These types of 
attacks are possible, even in the most highly secured systems. 
 
1.4 Intrusion Detection System 
Since any secure system can fail, extra effort should be provided to protect these 
systems. One such protection method, the intrusion detection systems (IDSs) has been 
proposed. Generally, intrusion detection has different meanings according to context. 
For instance, intrusion is defined as an action that successfully abuses certain security 
procedure (J. Zhou, Heckman, & Reynolds, 2007). IDS monitors the whole system in 
order to trigger alerts in the presence of any intrusion or malicious behavior. The system 
administrator will deal with the report of alerts to choose the proper action for each alert 
(Bace & Mell, 2001; Horng et al., 2010; Lauf, Peters, & Robinson, 2009). 
 
1.5 Intrusion Detection Systems Challenges 
IDS has become a required tool in any corporate network architecture. However, the 
way of detecting intrusions has remained imperfect. The main problem with IDSs is that 
they generate a huge amount of alerts that are not caused by real attacks (Tjhai, 
Papadaki, Furnell, & Clarke, 2008). These false alerts are referred to by the term false 
positive. False positive is a mystery term that describes the situation wherein the IDS 
triggers an alert when a malicious activity is initiated even in cases where the activity is 
not malicious. In other words, IDS can make a mistake (Pinyathinun & 
Sathitwiriyawong, 2009). Nevertheless, the IDS becomes a forensic tool since most 
administrators look into the alert log file to make their investigations after the intrusion 
has occurred. 
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Another problem with the present IDSs is the irrelevant alerts that the IDS triggers (e.g., 
a warning alert about a web-based attack that only works against Windows computers, 
while the target is a Linux computer). IDS alerts do not have sufficient information for 
the administrators to base their decisions on with regard to the right action to be taken 
for each intrusion. Any network environment contains different types of IDS sensors 
(NIDS, HIDS, and App-IDS) and each type is concerned about specific types of data. 
While the NIDS alert will cover the IPs and Ports, the HIDS will cover the buffer 
overflow. Given that all sensors will save their alerts in the same heterogeneous log file, 
dealing with these different structures of alerts will be an annoyance for the 
administrators. Moreover, since there are many sensors involved in monitoring the 
network and all sensors pump in their alerts in the same heterogeneous log file, the huge 
problem created by redundant alerts becomes an issue. The redundant alerts are 
sometimes the same alerts but with different sensor IDs, or possess a slight difference in 
the time stamp. Further explanation is provided in chapters two and three. 
 
1.6 Intrusion Detection Aggregation Systems 
Aggregation as a technique is a major part of correlation techniques which can reduce 
the complexity involved in alert analysis (P. Ning, Cui, & Reeves, 2002a) because the 
correlation will execute the alerts based on a specific classification. This step will be 
done after the aggregation has removed the redundant alerts to reduce their volume (H. 
Debar & Wespi, 2001). Removing the redundancy will depend on the similarity of the 
alerts’ features.  
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1.7 Problems with the Existing Aggregation Systems 
The main problem with all of the proposed alert aggregation systems is that they deal 
with it as a part of the correlation systems and they do not provide a complete 
aggregation solution. Instead, they only concentrate on a limited part of the aggregation 
process since one alert can represent all redundant alerts. For instance keeping redundant 
alerts because of the difference on sensor IDs will delay the process of correlation. The 
same problem will appear if there is a slightly different in time stamp between the alerts. 
The main problem with all the proposed alert aggregation systems is the manner with 
which they deal with aggregation as part of the correlation systems and thus, they do not 
provide a complete aggregation solution. Instead, they only concentrate on a limited part 
of the aggregation process since one alert can represent all redundant alerts. For 
instance, keeping redundant alerts because of the difference on sensor IDs will delay the 
process of correlation. The same problem will appear if there is a slight difference in the 
time stamp between the alerts. Failure in removing the redundant alerts will delay the 
process of correlation that may lead to inability of preventing a successful attack because 
action from the analyst has not yet been made. 
 
1.8 Intrusion Detection Correlation Systems  
In order to improve some of the intrusion detection systems problems, the alert 
correlation has been proposed. Alert correlation techniques deal with the IDS alerts after 
these have been collected in one file as heterogeneous file of multiple sensors. The 
purpose of correlating the alerts is to create high-level reports of the network status. The 
main goal of correlation is to achieve the minimum amount of alerts by reducing the 
false positive alerts and the redundant alerts by aggregation methods as well as ranking 
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and grouping the alerts that refer to the same event. The correlation techniques will 
classify the alerts into different classes based on their features such as IP addresses and 
port numbers. Consequently, the higher ranking of overall alerts with same feature 
similarity in the same class will be correlated (P. Ning, Y. Cui, D. S. Reeves, & D. Xu, 
2004). Alert correlation has been studied from different perspectives such as Attack 
scenario, Multi-stage, and Filtering. Attack scenario algorithms have been proposed 
because of the idea that normal attacks most probably will be executed in single attacks 
while complex attacks are executed in several episodes (Dain & Cunningham, 2002). 
Multi-stage address is the problem of detecting unknown attack. This approach is mainly 
based on the assumption that the attacks perform multiple steps to fulfill the global 
intrusion (Cuppens & Miege, 2002).  
 
Filtering-based approaches have been proposed to remove the need for complicated 
attack library and to reduce the amount of unrelated or irrelevant alerts. These 
approaches are based on non-existing services. Filtering-based approaches consider the 
topology and the operational objectives of the protected network during the alert 
correlation (P. Porras, M. Fong, & A. Valdes, 2002). 
 
 
 
1.9 Problems with the Existing Correlation Methods 
The proposed correlation methods only cover a limited part of the correlation process. 
Thus, several problems have not been addressed. For instance, multi-step correlation 
executes the alerts in three steps, namely, managing, clustering, and merging. This 
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technique does not reduce the problem of the high false positive rate of IDS alerts. The 
quality of the heterogeneous alert file affects the correlation process and it will consume 
more time to be correlated (Liu, Zheng, & Yang, 2010).  
 
1.10 Problem Statement  
The current correlation methods deal with one type of alerts but cannot handle the 
combination of multiple alert types. Existing methods cannot be easily extended, and 
they only operate in online or offline data.  
 
This thesis presents an online-offline IDS alert management system which can also be 
used as a forensic tool. The system supports any type of alerts with minimum 
requirements. It can be easily updated by adding new aggregation or correlation 
components. The system requires minimal processing to produce the final reports after 
implementing the two processes of aggregation and correlation. The components 
(subsystems), aggregation, and correlation can work together or independently. The 
performance of each subsystem and the overall performance of the framework were 
evaluated using different datasets from multiple IDS audit data. 
 
 
 
1.11 Objectives of the Study 
The objectives of this thesis are: 
• To reduce the amount of false positive alerts, noise (rubbish) and non relative 
alerts from IDS alerts. 
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• To enhance the forensic studies by giving the choice to the user to group the IDS 
alerts either by the aggregation or the correlation based on online data or offline 
data. 
• To use the Multi-Core technology OpenMP in aggregating and correlating the 
alerts. 
 
1.12 Contributions of this thesis 
IDS alerts analysts suffer from analyzing IDS alerts because of the huge amount of 
redundancy and false positive (Zurutuza & Uribeetxeberria, 2004). This thesis provides 
solutions for the problems outlined above, and provides the following contributions: 
• IDS alert aggregation framework: New aggregation framework called Threshold 
Aggregation Framework (TAF) to aggregate IDS alerts based on time threshold, 
this framework proposed to enhance the IDS alerts filtering and to remove the 
redundant alerts. 
• Filtering and parsing method: this method aims to filter and parse the incomplete 
alerts (alerts with missing features) by modifying them to reduce the processing 
time of aggregation the IDS alerts.  
• IDS alert correlation framework: New correlation framework called Group 
Correlation Framework (GCF), this framework based on aggregation filtered 
results, proposed to smooth the alerts to give a better relational alerts, with less 
amount of original alerts and reducing the false positive alerts. 
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• New correlation algorithm: this algorithm called Parallel Group Correlation (P-
GC), this algorithm is introduced to enhance the correlation speed based on 
Multi-Core technology (OpenMP). 
• False positive reduction by two steps after the aggregation by removing the 
redundant alerts and after the correlation by removing none correlated alerts. 
• IDS Alerts management system: This system is a standalone system which can 
work on online alerts or offline alerts to be used as Forensic Investigation 
System, the aggregation and correlation frameworks together form a complete 
system aims to help the analyst having a condensed overview of security-related 
activities on the network. 
 
1.13  Research Methodology 
The methodology of our research has two parts: Aggregation and Correlation. 
• IDS Alerts Aggregation; the methodology of aggregation based on the Threshold 
Aggregation Framework (TAF), this framework works on the similarity between 
the alerts’ features based on a threshold time value (the concept based on 
mathematical Row Echelon Form). TAF has three main components: the Data 
Controller, the Framework Core and the Aggregation Controller.  
• IDS Alerts Correlation; the methodology of the correlation based on Group 
Correlation Framework (GCF), this framework works on Apriori algorithm 
(mathematical data set combination) to find the relationships between the alerts 
based on the grouped alerts from the aggregation framework TAF (the output of 
TAF is the input of GCF). 
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1.14  Thesis Organization 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter two will give an over view 
of the related works in the area of reducing the false positive of IDS alerts, aggregating 
the IDS alerts and correlating them, at the end of this chapter we give a comparison 
between the related works and our research work. Chapter three will give a closer view 
on our methodologies of aggregating and correlating the IDS alerts with more 
explanations on the IDS Alerts Management System (IDSAMS) and its two subsystems. 
Chapter four describes the algorithms of the IDSAMS subsystems, the mathematical 
proof of the algorithms and gives an implementation details on both of the two 
subsystems. Chapter five illustrates the evaluation of the components and 
subcomponents of each subsystem of the IDSAMS, explains the results we achieved and 
compare our results with the existing related system. Chapter six highlights the 
conclusion of the whole research and gives a forward view of the future work. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter investigates the related works on IDS false positive problem. Previous 
works on IDS false positive employed two different perspectives based on the reduction 
process. The false positive reduction process can be done either at the sensor level as a 
part of intrusion detection systems or after the intrusion detection process on the log 
alert file as a forensic method.  
 
In this chapter, we discuss the false positive problem and the ways of reducing the 
amount of the false alerts in the IDS alerts log file by aggregating and correlating the 
alerts. 
 
2.1 Classification of IDSs 
IDSs can be classified in numerous ways. The general way of classifying is based on 
detection method, audit source, usage frequency, and behavior of detection method (H 
Debar, Dacier, & Wespi, 1999). 
 
2.1.1 IDS Based on Detection Method 
IDS has two main intrusion detection techniques. These are anomaly detection and 
misuse detection. Anomaly detection technique determines the abnormality by 
measuring the distance between the suspicious activities and the norm based on the 
chosen threshold. Misuse detection technique searches for malicious signature or pattern 
based on the set of rules or signatures to detect intrusive behavior. Difference between 
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these two IDSs exists. The misuse detection cannot detect novel attacks but it has a 
lower rate of false positive alerts while anomaly detection detects the novel attacks with 
a higher rate of false positive alert. However, combining these two detection approaches 
will provide a more efficient detection method with a lower rate of false positive alerts 
(Alharby & Imai, 2005). 
 
Misuse detection methods are based on two types either stateless or stateful systems. 
Stateless systems examine each event separately in the input stream to determine 
whether an event is malicious or not; stateful systems examine the events and the 
relationships between them to know the history of events in each attack. Stateful systems 
can support more complex rules than stateless systems which make these systems more 
expensive in relation to CPU usage and memory space (Vigna, Robertson, Kher, & 
Kemmerer, 2003). 
 
Anomaly detection methods fall into two categories: learning-based or specification-
based. Learning-based anomaly detection method is based on neural networks and 
consists of two phases, namely, a training phase and detection phase. The training phase 
aims to teach the system about the properties of the normal traffic by assuming that the 
training audit data contain zero attacks; otherwise, the system will include these attacks 
in the normality traffic. After the training phase is conducted, the system goes to the 
detection phase. In this phase, the input traffic data are compared with the trained traffic 
data from the first phase. The system will report an anomaly and trigger an alert if there 
is any audit event that does not match the learned traffic data (Das, Matthews, 
Srivastava, & Oza, 2010).  
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Specification-based anomaly detection methods depend on a specification of the normal 
traffic type. The specification can be specified as either manually or automatically 
generated. Automatic specification relies on the user manual specification and depends 
on human experience to define the properties of events. After defining the specification, 
the system will start detecting the intrusions by comparing all legal sequences generated 
by a program with the current sequences of the program (Najjar & Azgomi, 2010; 
Wagner & Dean, 2001). 
 
2.1.2 IDS Based on Audit Source 
Another way of classifying IDS is by the audit data that are used to detect the intrusions. 
There are three categories of audit data: Network intrusion detection systems (NIDS), 
Host intrusion detection systems (HIDS), and Application intrusion detection systems 
(App-IDS) (Najjar & Azgomi, 2010). 
 
NIDS deal with the packets from the protected network. Detection in these systems deals 
with the full packets, packet headers, or Netflow data. Other NIDS deal with the firewall 
logs to check the packet headers of the blocked packets (Corchado & Herrero, 2010; 
Sekar, Guang, Verma, & Shanbhag, 1999). 
 
HIDS are the first invented intrusion detection systems. The target environment for the 
detection is a mainframe computer since the interaction from outside is rare. The 
intrusion detection analyzes the audit information provided by the mainframe, either 
locally or by a separate machine, and reported as suspicious security events (H Debar, et 
al., 1999; Najjar & Azgomi, 2010). 
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App-IDS deal with the log which has been created by a user space application. 
Application intrusion detection systems solve some of the problems that might be 
present in the network-based detection. This approach has the ability to perform 
intrusion detection analysis at different stages based on client requests (Vigna, et al., 
2003). 
 
2.1.3 IDS Based on Usage Frequency 
IDS based on user frequency IDS can be classified as either Online Systems which deals 
with real audit data at the time the data are generated, or Offline Systems where the 
system is run frequently to look for signs of attack based on a period of time. 
 
2.1.4 IDS Based on Behavior of Detection 
This classification is based on the type of response when an intrusion occurs. The 
response either be passive based, meaning where the administrator will be notified after 
an intrusion happened by such means as email, or active based on the logic of blocking 
the attacks as a prevention. This system is called intrusion Prevention system (IPS) 
(Ierace, Urrutia, & Bassett, 2005). 
 
2.2 False Positive Problem 
False positive problem is a mystery term that describes the situation where the IDS 
triggers alerts when a malicious activity occurs even if the activity is not malicious. 
Thus, IDS makes a mistake (Ranum, 2003). IDS triggers thousands of alerts, 99% of 
which are false positive (Furnell et al., 2008; Jamdagni, Tan, Nanda, He, & Liu; 
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Spathoulas & Katsikas, 2010; Yusof, Selamat, & Sahib, 2008; Zurutuza & 
Uribeetxeberria, 2004). 
 
Organizing and dealing with the recorded logs and generated alerts by the security 
sensors such as the IDS, firewalls, packet filtering, and servers are not easy. Most of the 
organizations consider these alerts as a major problem. Since these sensors are 
independent, they will trigger alerts and send these to the analyst for analysis towards 
understanding the nature of the intrusion using the provided tools, methods, and 
techniques. This leads to the reduction of the false alert rate and the increase of the 
attack detection rate. In spite of these, weaknesses still exist in these processes because 
of the quality of the input data. Dealing with huge number of alerts containing equally 
large number of false alerts will be the manner with which any sensor works even when 
a harmless event occurs (Yurcik, 2002; Yusof, et al., 2008). False positive can be 
reduced during the time of detection of the attack (sensor level) or after the detection (on 
the heterogeneous alerts log file). 
 
2.2.1 Sensor Level False Alerts Reduction 
Reducing false positive alerts during the detection of the attacks was addressed by many 
studies using different techniques and methods like the fuzzy cognitive maps (FCM) 
which is a soft computing modeling techniques generated from the compensation of 
fuzzy logic and neural network. In this proposed solution the measurements based on 
(availability, similarity, occurrence, relevancy, independent and correlation factors), the 
second step is to assign an effect value for each one of the factors to estimate the total 
degree of abnormality per packet. Depending on the factor value the packet will be 
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dropped or ignored. That if the packet is below malicious and if not it will be considered 
as real alert in the (FCM). The last step is to measure the (effect/influence) value and 
there is a degree from 0 to 1, while 0 means normal relation and 1 means high relation. 
This study shows that improving the detection deficiency will be by reducing the false 
alerts and increasing the detection accuracy at the sensor level (Jazzar & Bin Jantan, 
2008). 
 
Lui used agents and data mining technology to give more accuracy by capturing the 
actual behavior of network traffic. There are three types of agents for the three data 
mining techniques: (clustering, association rules and sequential association rules). The 
number of agents will be different in both training and detection process, the clustering-
base agents extracts properties from traffic in terms of frames and tries to make the 
normal traffic in the training stage. If the unknown traffic is far from the normal cluster 
it is classified as an attack. The association rule-based agent finds out the relationship 
between features selected and traffic property in the training phase. The agents will 
capture the rule of selected features and in the detection phase, the agents count the rules 
of each connection to be matched, when the frequency is less than the threshold it 
classified as an attack. The sequential association rule-based agents (in the training 
phase) capture the sequential patterns in network traffic dialog to assist the association 
mining process. In the detection phase the agents tests the abnormal connections 
matched within the (packet/time) frame. If it is larger than the threshold, it will be 
declared as an attack. In the decision maker stage, they check if the alert is generated 
from both clustering based and rule based to declare an attack, else it will be a false alert 
from one side which will be eliminated by the other side (Lui, Fu, & Cheung, 2005). 
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Pi-Cheng made an optimization of the rule selection and the attack identification in 
attack analysis, by proposing a scenario-based approach to correlate malicious packets 
and to select intrusion-detection rules in intelligent way. The scenario-based approach is 
based on how to choose rules to be tested according to the threats detected and attack 
scenarios identified at the moment of the attack. Instead of being tested simply 
according to some predetermined order, depending on a dependency graph which is a 
direct acyclic graph, the main idea of this approach is to classify rules in the rule 
database in terms of threats and thus associate the rules with a dependency graph (Pi-
Cheng, Chin-Fu, Tei-Wei, & Juan, 2005). 
 
2.2.2 False Alerts Reduction after the Detection Level 
Reducing the false positive after detection means reducing the amount of false alerts in 
the alert’s file. In other words, the false alerts are differentiated from the real alerts. In 
order to know the differences between real and false alerts, researchers began studying 
and analyzing the alerts’ features. This resulted in the formulation of three approaches: 
alerts aggregation, alerts correlation, and the combination of both. 
 
Alerts Aggregation Techniques 
Aggregation techniques have been used in many fields in computer science to minimize 
the analysis time and to reduce redundant packet transmissions in networks such as the 
centralized, tree-based, static-cluster, and dynamic-cluster aggregation schemes (Park, 
2006). IDS aggregation technique studies are used for grouping and minimizing the 
alerts to facilitate the process of analysis and removal of redundant alerts. Aggregation 
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techniques are based on the similarity of features because several alerts are related to a 
similar event. Generally, these alerts have similar features and many sensors can trigger 
the same alert on similar attacks with different formats. Thus, numerous alerts are 
triggered which should be aggregated into one alert.  
 
Kanamaru proposed a packet aggregation technique to aggregate the packets in order to 
minimize analysis time of the fault packets to be detected. The proposed aggregation 
model character is based on sender and receiver addresses (Kanamaru et al, 2000). 
Depending on these addresses, three combination models have been formulated: 
1) 1 – 1 Model This model concern on the flow from a specific source address to a 
specific destination address. 
2) 1 – M Model This model concern on the flow from a specific source address to 
any destination address. 
3) M - 1 Model This model concern on the flow from any source address to a 
specific destination address. 
The aggregated packets from the whole captured packets were computed by using the 
following formula: 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝 × 100 = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(%)                   (2.1) 
This study shows that the result of using the combination model is effective in 
characterizing packets. The administrator can obtain useful information for fault 
detection from the aggregated packets. In addition, the administrator can decide if the 
problem is of low severity (between two hosts) or high severity (between router and 
server). This model has been used to detect fault packets but never as a model to detect 
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false alerts. The evaluation was based on capturing real (385786) packets from the 
network to obtain (161778) aggregated packets of 191 symptoms. The aggregated 
percentage was 42% of the original capture packets. 
 
Valdes proposed a framework for a general aggregation algorithm by including five 
features of the alerts’ features. These are source IP addresses, source ports, destination 
IP addresses, destination ports, and alert generation time (Valdes & Skinner, 2001). 
The compression result of each feature is a value between 0 and 1, while the similarity 
calculation and the weights of each feature depend on configuration definition. 
Aggregation of the alerts will be done depending on the predefined weights and the 
compared result of each feature. The overall similarity between any two alerts is 
computed by the following equation: 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌) = ∑ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 ,𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗 )𝑗𝑗
∑ 𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
                                                      (2.2) 
Where X = Candidate meta alert for matching 
Y = New alert 
j = Index over the alert features 
Ej = Expectation of similarity for feature j 
X j,Yj = Values for feature j in alerts X and Y, respectively. 
 
This approach has been evaluated by experimenting on 4439 alerts triggered by IDS 
sensor to obtain 604 Meta alerts. The result was 14% Meta alerts of the origin alerts file. 
Another proposed solution was based on the exact matching of three features (IP source, 
IP destination, and Alert class) (H. Debar & Wespi, 2001). The aggregation of the alerts 
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was performed by seven levels based on the similarity of Source IP (S), Destination IP 
(D), and Alert Class (C). The seven levels are: 
{Same (S, D, C), Same (S, D), Same (S, C), Same (D, C), Same (S), Same (D) and Same 
(C)}. A threshold value for choosing the level of alerts aggregation is involved. The 
aggregation reduces slight amount of alerts because the aggregation process starts after 
the alerts have been correlated. 
 
A different result was achieved from the study of (Valdes & Skinner, 2001) by (Mu, 
Huang, Tian, Lin, & Qin, 2005)  The authors proposed a method that uses fuzzy matrix 
in the final evaluation to achieve a slightly better experiment results with the use of only 
the source IP addresses and alert generation time.  
 
Autrel proposed another aggregation technique to categorize alert features into four 
classes based on the Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF) node class 
which contains Alert Location, Alert Name, and Alert Address (Curry, Debar, & 
Feinstein, 2002) (Autrel & Cuppens, 2005). The proposed aggregation technique, which 
was based on the similarity operator, was used to compute the similarity of the same 
class of features in order to obtain a similarity value between two alerts. Calculation of 
the similarity values between attributes of the alerts was done which allowed 
aggregation. Consequently, the final similarity value was obtained. In this aggregation 
technique, no discussion on the weight function for each class was conducted. The 
evaluation performed by developing a system to aggregate (3776) alerts in 64 clusters 
for two sets of 32 clusters for each cluster obtained a different target. Thus, they used the 
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first 32 clusters with one target. The results using this approach achieved 1.7% 
aggregated alerts. 
 
Dain suggested that the alerts should be first categorized on the basis of the attack 
scenario. For each existing scenario they calculated the probability that the new alert 
belongs to this scenario or not (Dain & Cunningham, 2002). The new alert was assigned 
to the scenario that produced the highest probability score. When all the scores were 
below the threshold, the new alert was not included to any scenario and instead, a new 
scenario was started. The alerts were aggregated by two approaches (Naïve Technique 
and Heuristic Technique). The naïve technique assumes that all attacks that belong to a 
single scenario share a common source address. The heuristic technique assumes that the 
new alert needs to be compared with the last scenario depending on the alert time. In the 
evaluation performed using three different amounts of datasets, the best results 
contained (246316) alerts. After aggregation, (4041) join decisions were obtained. The 
total result was 1.6% aggregated alerts. 
 
Alerts Correlation Techniques 
Correlation is part of the intrusion detection studies that smoothens the progress in the 
analysis of intrusion alerts based on the similarity between alert attributes. This can be 
represented mathematically as: CorrAlert = {Alert1, Alert2, … , Alertn}                                                                          (2.3) 
The group of alerts {Alert1, Alert2, … , Alertn} with the same features and are related is 
represented by CorrAlert. However, most of the correlation methods focus on IDS alerts 
by examining other intrusion evidence provided by system monitoring tools or scanning 
25 
 
tools. The aim of correlation analysis is to detect relationships among alerts to promote 
building of attack scenarios (J. Zhou, et al., 2007; Zhu & Ghorbani, 2006; Zurutuza & 
Uribeetxeberria, 2004). 
 
Classification of Alert Correlation Technique 
IDS alerts correlation studies employ various perspectives and use many methods and 
techniques which can be categorized as similarity-based, pre-defined attack scenarios, 
pre-requisites and consequences, and statistical causal analysis (Xu & Ning; Yusof, et 
al., 2008; Zhu & Ghorbani, 2006). 
 
i. Similarity-Based  
Similarity-based approach attempts to estimate the similarities between two alerts 
depending on their features (Chen, Garcia, Gupta, Rahimi, & Cazzanti, 2009). IDSs 
trigger alerts when suspicious actions are monitored. These alerts have several features 
such as source IP address, source port, destination IP address, destination port, alert 
classification, and timestamp. Based on these feature values, similarity-based alert 
correlation approaches have been proposed to compute the similarities between two or 
more alerts, and subsequently group the related alerts together based on the extracted 
similar features.  
 
These methods are closely related to data clustering techniques in data mining (Tan, 
Steinbach, & Kumar, 2006) because a group of similar alerts corresponds to the same 
attack or attack category. Similarity-based approach tries to reduce the number of alerts 
in the heterogeneous file that have been reported to the security analysts.  
